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Abstract 
 
After the United States achieved its goal of denuclearizing in the post-Soviet space, the 
essence of their policy toward Ukraine is to support Ukraine’s independence and deter Russia's rise. 
There are three vectors of US policy towards Ukraine: 1) Protection of the sovereignty and integrity 
of Ukraine. 2) Assistance to Ukraine in joining NATO. 3) Helping Ukraine get rid of Russia's 
economic and energy dependence. The actions of the United States after the Ukrainian crisis are a 
clear manifestation of this given direction. The US policy towards Ukraine is based on a 
fundamental opposition to Russia's policy. The confrontation between the United States and Russia 
in Ukraine is more a confrontation of strategic will than a confrontation of strategic interests. In the 
future, the United States and Russia may somehow resolve the Ukrainian crisis and break out of 
their confrontation. The new US political practice after the civil war in Ukraine also confirms this to 
a certain extent. 
The issue investigated in the article is to identify the main causes and characteristics of certain 
aspects of relations between the United States and Ukraine, which caused the Ukrainian crisis and, 
as a result, led to a split in society and anti-Russian sentiments. The article summarizes some 
historical experience of Ukrainian nationalism and American imperialism, leading to the Ukrainian 
crisis. 
The relevance of the article is that topic has not been sufficiently analyzed in political science. 
The availability of materials and sources about Ukrainian crisis requires the generalization, 
systematization and scientific understanding of the fact of the USА strategy in the fight against 
Russia. The study of this topic allows to summarize the results of political processes in Ukraine. 
 
Keywords: USA, Russia, Ukrainian crisis, the USA - Ukraine relations 
 
1. Introduction 
The United States and Ukraine did not establish diplomatic relations for a long time, because 
the countries are geographically far apart, lack of historical and cultural points of contact and deep 
interdependence in the economy. After the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, the United States 
showed unprecedented attention to Ukraine: political, economic and military support was 
unprecedented, and this support became one of the important triggers for exacerbating the crisis. 
Whatever the US goal in the Ukrainian crisis, this goal causes widespread public concern. Russian 
analysts and the political community summarize that the US goal is to “draw Russia into a war with 
Ukraine”. [1] In fact, we can see that the United States is detrimental to Ukraine, and not 
contributing to development. Some analysts in Ukraine summarize that “the United States 
facilitated Ukraine’s accession to the EU”. [1] I believe, that the goal is to turn Ukraine into a barrier 
between Europe and Russia and reduce the chances of establishing a strategic alliance between the 
EU and Russia.  
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What is the US goal in the Ukrainian crisis? This goal involves making the highest decisions 
in US diplomatic circles, and the crisis is not over yet, and the situation is still evolving. It is still 
difficult to give a clear and affirmative answer regarding the US goal in Ukraine. 
Analyzing the relations between the USA and Ukraine, the author tries to reveal the nature of 
the US policy towards Ukraine. I hope to give a scientific and rational point of view on the answer 
to this question. 
2. Research question and methodology 
The study of selected research summarizing the results of political processes in Ukraine, and 
allows to reveal the goals of the United States in relation to post-Soviet Ukraine. 
The main sources are books and articles in periodicals, Internet resources. 
The methodological basis of the study are the basic principles: the priority of common human 
values, the consideration of political and geopolitical realities, historicism, objectivity and science. 
To solve the scientific problem, the following methodological methods were used: logical method; 
induction and deduction method; analysis and synthesis; system method; comparative historical 
method and some others methods. The use of these methods allowed me to show the problem under 
investigation as a system, allowed to highlight the contradictions, it allowed to identify the 
contradictions that were the basis of the Ukrainian political crisis. In the end, the use of these 
methods allowed me to determine interests of the United States and identify the main characteristics 
and trends. 
The theoretical material of international relations is covered in detail by the following authors: 
N.P. Tereshchenko [2]; Yu. P. Malov [3]; M. G. Delyagin [4]; S.I. Aksenenko [5]; N.Y. Azarov [6]; S.P. 
Buntovsky [7]; P. G. Gubarev [8]; A. D. Smirnov [9]; S.V. Chernyavsky [10]; D.E. Muse [11]; A.N. 
Matantsev [12]; A. O. Mitrofanov [13]; L. Dehiyo [14]; E.N. Pashentsev [15]. Information of the 
geopolitical approach can be studied through the scientific work of A.G. Gasparyan [16]. A.G. 
Gasparyan was one of the first to note that Ukraine had been under the influence of various political 
forces (Western and Eastern politics) for a long time and attributed it to the type of split countries.  
The current situation in Ukraine was reviewed using current publications on the problems of 
the domestic political crisis in Ukraine and relations with Russia. In the process of considering the 
development of the domestic political situation in Ukraine, international agreements were used as a 
theoretical basis. 
 
3. The development of USA and Ukraine relations 
3.1 Initial stage of establishing diplomatic relations 
On January 3, 1992, the United States and Ukraine formally established diplomatic relations. 
At the beginning of independence, Ukraine carried out comprehensive political, economic and 
military reforms in full accordance with the Western model, and also carried out “one-sided” pro-
American diplomacy in foreign policy. In May 1992, after the meeting of the presidents of the two 
countries, an «Agreement on relations between the USA and Ukraine and the establishment of a 
democratic partnership» was signed. This agreement established the basic norms for the 
development of bilateral relations. But the so-called “democratic partnership” is just a cover and has 
no significant and practical aspects. The goal of the US policy towards Ukraine at that time was to 
quickly destroy more than 2,150 tactical nuclear weapons and more than 185 strategic nuclear 
weapons left over from the Soviet Union. In accordance with the «Lisbon Protocol», Ukraine was 
the legal successor to the «Strategic Arms Reduction Аagreement», signed by the Soviet Union on 
July 31, 1991. Ukraine has committed itself to adhere to its policy of becoming a non-nuclear state 
and is ready to join the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
On January 14, 1994, US President B. Clinton, Russian President B. Yeltsin, and Ukrainian 
President L. Kravchuk signed a trilateral agreement on the destruction of nuclear weapons on the 
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territory of Ukraine, according to which Ukraine will send all nuclear weapons to Russia for 
destruction. On February 4, 1994, the Ukrainian parliament approved the first stage of a treaty on 
reducing strategic offensive potentials, and on November 18, Ukraine ratified the agreement of the 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. From this point on, relations between the United States and 
Ukraine entered a new era. The political strategy of the United States towards Ukraine and Russia 
also entered the new era.  
3.2 Stable period of relations development 
After L. Kuchma became president in March 1994, he made significant adjustments to 
Ukraine’s foreign policy. Kuchma rejected the “one-sided” approach to the United States and 
marked the beginning of a “balance” strategy that has the same approach to the United States, 
Europe and Russia. The United States at that time emphasized that "the existence, security and 
prosperity of a free, independent and sovereign Ukraine is of great importance for the United 
States". [17] This is a turning point in US policy toward Ukraine, which shows that the United States 
no longer looks at Ukraine only from the point of view of Russian politics, but instead develops its 
own interests in Ukraine. In 1996, Ukraine officially announced that all nuclear weapons on its 
territory had been sent to Russia, and the problem of the destruction of nuclear weapons in Ukraine 
was completely resolved. The relations of the USA and Ukraine have entered a new stage of 
comprehensive economic, political and military cooperation. In 1997, both sides began to develop a 
strategic partnership. In 1999, the US government supported the Ukrainian opposition, criticizing 
the Ukrainian government for suppressing the will of the people, thereby offending the Ukrainian 
government. In 1999, NATO launched an air strike against Yugoslavia. Ukraine has publicly 
expressed its disagreement. After Kuchma was re-elected in 2000, Ukraine adopted a new 
“comprehensive” diplomatic policy, in parallel, developing relations with major world powers, such 
as the United States, Russia, the European Union and China, and actively supporting the world 
multi-polar system. In the same year, the Bush administration adopted a stricter policy toward 
Ukraine. The White House criticized Ukraine for serious corruption, the lack of progress in 
implementing reforms and announced a reduction in economic assistance to Ukraine. The US also 
imposed economic sanctions on the Ukrainian government for non-compliance with the will of the 
people. In 2001, under pressure from Kuchma, pro-American Prime Minister V. Yushchenko was 
forced to resign, and in Ukraine there was a serious political crisis. Due to political instability in 
Ukraine, the Ukrainian Communist Party came to power and the United States decided to support 
Kuchma. Relations between the two countries are back on the right track. At the celebration of the 
10th anniversary of Ukraine’s independence in 2001, US National Security Adviser S. Rice 
personally led the delegation in Kiev to participate in the celebration. The United States also 
recognizes Ukraine as a European country, strengthens Ukraine’s position in its foreign policy 
planning and is beginning to develop relations with Ukraine from a global and strategic point of 
view. 
3.3 Stagnation in relationships 
After the success of the “Velvet Revolution” in Georgia in 2003, the United States viewed 
Ukraine as the main springboard of political penetration into the CIS countries and sought to use the 
opportunity of the presidential elections in Ukraine in October 2004 to completely turn Ukraine into 
a “country of democracy and freedom”. After the announcement of the first round of elections, 
Kuchma supported V. Yanukovych’s victory, but the United States refused to recognize the election 
results and recalled the ambassador in protest. With US support, opposition parties led by 
Yushchenko and Y. Tymoshenko began large-scale street protests, the Ukrainian authorities had to 
hold a second round of elections, and Yushchenko finally won the election. In April 2005, 
Yushchenko promised J. Bush that he would lead Ukraine to integrate into Western society and 
completely fall out of Russia's sphere of influence. The parties also unanimously agreed to 
strengthen cooperation between the two countries in the field of combating terrorism, fighting 
corruption and organized crime. Strategic partnership is a sign that relations between the two 
4 
 
countries have reached a new level. However, soon after the signing of the strategic partnership 
agreement, the governments of both countries changed their attitudes towards each other and 
bilateral relations were again put to the test. After B. Obama was elected president, he put forward 
the diplomatic line of “smart power”. Unlike Bush’s “one-sided” policy, Obama stressed that “the 
United States will not openly interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine, but will use more financial, 
humanitarian and other means as an instrument of influence on the internal affairs and diplomacy of 
Ukraine”. [18] The main vector of US policy: firstly, the promotion of pro-American forces in 
Ukraine to increase influence in the Ukrainian political arena, as well as the expansion of the 
political base in the East and Southeast. Secondly, to increase the attention and support of Ukrainian 
youth organizations. Third, the preparation of Ukraine to join NATO. Fourthly, strengthening 
relations with the main Ukrainian political parties. Fifth, increased attention to the Crimean region. 
This is not only the base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, but also an important area for the 
exploration and development of oil on the Black Sea in the future. In 2011, the EU fell into a 
sovereign debt crisis, the “Arab Spring” caused a larger revolution in the Middle East and North 
Africa, and Ukraine’s importance in the overall US diplomatic line declined. Yanukovych’s 
expansion of his power, control over the appointment of central and local officials, suppression of 
the media, suppression of the opposition, especially the criminal prosecution of his political 
opponent Tymoshenko, again raised US concerns about the development of democracy. The 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank also disagreed with Yanukovych’s economic 
reforms. This situation in bilateral relations persisted until the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis in 
2014.  
4. The essence of the US policy towards Ukraine 
Eurasia - the most important geopolitical goal of the United States. The central position of 
Eastern Europe, in which Ukraine is located, is an important link in achieving this goal. Ukraine is 
an important “trump card” for the United States in deterring Russia's revival and the struggle for 
hegemony. 
In 1995, in a report of US national interests, in collaboration with Harvard University, 
countries were listed for the first time that have vital interests for the United States. This country is 
Ukraine. It is necessary to turn Ukraine against Russia and allow it to join Europe. The key to 
hegemony is “democratic partnership”. The main character of relations between Ukraine and the 
United States is determined. The agreement on nuclear weapons is being destroyed, which removes 
the biggest obstacle to the development of US-Ukrainian cooperation. For further development, 
there must be a new impulse. Support for the independence of Ukraine, opposition to Russia's 
influence, naturally, will become the main goal of the US policy towards Ukraine. 
To achieve this goal, there were chosen three areas: 
1) Resolutely defend the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine and support Ukraine as a regional power. 
Ukraine is not only the only power in the CIS that can compete with Russia, but also plays an 
indispensable role in maintaining stability and balance in the CIS and Eastern Europe. The US 
needs to achieve advantages in the Black Sea region and strengthen its influence in the CIS. The 
rapid development of Ukraine will have a serious impact on the security and stability of Europe. 
Therefore, since 1993, the United States has been pursuing a policy of supporting Ukraine as a 
regional power. In 1995, Clinton made a clear statement at Kiev University that “the United States 
views Ukraine as a key factor in European security and stability and emphasizes the importance of 
an economically prosperous, democratic and stable Ukraine in Europe and the international 
community”. [19] 
2) Promoting the integration of Ukraine in the "Western world". 
The unique geographical position of Ukraine and its regional influence made it an important 
part of the changing geopolitical security structures of the former Soviet Union. Whether Ukraine 
will be integrated into the “Western world” or will remain with Russia, this will have a serious 
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impact and change the entire geopolitical structure of the Eurasian region. In particular, Ukraine 
was once an important part of the former Soviet military and economic system: after the unification 
of Russia and Ukraine, they would restore strong geopolitical power in Eurasia. Therefore, at the 
beginning of Ukraine’s independence, the US Congress adopted a resolution directly calling for a 
boycott of all regional organizations and integration mechanisms that would help the former Soviet 
Union to unite. After Yushchenko’s victory in the “Orange Revolution”, he began a new round of 
the diplomatic process for joining NATO. A visit to Strasbourg, Brussels, Warsaw and Berlin began 
the radical process of Ukraine joining NATO. The US has also become more active in promoting 
Ukraine’s entry into NATO, and both sides signed a memorandum on Ukraine’s commitment to 
join NATO as soon as possible, which will allow NATO troops to conduct exercises throughout 
Ukraine. The United States also stated that Ukraine’s entry into NATO was a priority for US policy 
in Eastern Europe and agreed to establish a NATO office in Ukraine. However, Russia is 
categorically against it: Russia in the 2008 Russian-Georgian war demonstrated its determination to 
use force to stop the expansion of NATO to the East. Yanukovych, under the influence of Moscow, 
took the initiative to exclude the agenda for Ukraine’s entry into NATO. Therefore, Western 
concerns about the direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy are quite understandable. 
3) Strengthening economic and energy cooperation with Ukraine. Helping Ukraine 
gradually get rid of its dependence on Russia. 
At the beginning of independence, the Ukrainian economy faced a collapse, and efforts to 
obtain US economic assistance became the main content of Ukrainian diplomacy. However, the 
relationship did not develop smoothly. The US may consider providing more economic assistance 
only if Ukraine accelerates reforms, copes with inflation and budget deficits, and quickly privatizes 
and transitions to a market economy. Ukraine also believes that it can complete the reforms only 
with the help of an infusion of Western funds. 
In December 2010, Obama announced that “Ukraine will be included in the list of priority 
states in the field of global nuclear security”. [20] At the summit on the strategic partnership of the 
United States and Ukraine, held in February 2011 in Washington, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Ukraine K. Grishchenko and US Secretary of State H. Clinton reached a consensus on cooperation 
in the field of energy. The energy sector will become the most important issue in the bilateral 
strategic dialogue. The United States will fully support the development of Ukraine’s energy and 
shale gas production. That contradicts the interests of Russia.  
 
5. Three vectors of US policy in the Ukrainian crisis 
After many years of hard work, the United States achieved its initial political goal against 
Ukraine, preventing Ukraine’s proximity to Russia and securing its influence in this important 
strategic region. After the Ukrainian crisis, Russia not only violated all agreements reached after the 
end of the “Cold War”, but also clearly intended to fully include Ukraine in its sphere of influence. 
This is not only a change in the regional model after the end of the “Cold War”, but also a complete 
undermining of the US policy towards Ukraine. Therefore, the United States has shown the 
unprecedented importance of Ukraine in political, economic and military support for Ukraine. 
In light of the various measures taken by the United States after the Ukrainian crisis, it can be 
tentatively determined that the goals of the United States in the Ukrainian crisis are mainly the 
following: 
First, it is the support of a democratic government recognized by the West. After the departure 
of V. Yanukovych, the United States quickly recognized the new regime. After US Vice President J. 
Biden visited Kiev on April 23, 2014, he announced a large-scale program to help Ukraine, 
including giving Ukrainians $ 50 million for political and economic reforms. On May 29, P. 
Poroshenko was elected president, and Obama was the first to congratulate him. The US State 
Department announced the introduction of a new visa system for citizens of Ukraine. 
Secondly, support the independence and sovereignty of Ukraine. The United States clearly 
opposed the dependence of the Crimea and eastern Ukraine on Russia. After Kiev began military 
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operations in the east of the country, the United States provided Ukraine with military assistance, 
including explosive devices, portable radios, engineering equipment, communications equipment, 
and transportation. On June 2, 2014, Derek Shole, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security, said that “the US budget to help Ukraine will increase to $ 18 million”. [21] 
Third, support Ukraine in joining the EU and strengthen cooperation with NATO. After 
Yanukovych refused to sign an association agreement with the EU, the US State Department 
immediately expressed disappointment. After the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, US officials 
have repeatedly expressed their support for Ukraine in joining the EU. At the NATO summit in 
Wales on September 4, 2014, Obama and other NATO leaders met with Poroshenko and announced 
that they would work to support Ukraine in responding to the crisis as part of a special partnership 
between NATO and Ukraine, and promised to provide 15 million euros. From 13 to 26 September, 
NATO conducted joint military exercises in Lviv city. 
 
6. Euromaidan and events in the East of Ukraine 
6.1 Euromaidan political process 
Ten years ago, the attention of the whole world was riveted on Ukraine - there were massive 
political protests, which later called the “Orange Revolution”. The internal political crisis caused by 
the opposition of various interest groups within the Ukrainian ruling elites turned for some into a 
“civilizational choice”, for others - a geopolitical clash of external forces. Then it seemed that the 
choice was made, and the bout brought victory to one of the sides. The victorious team of Viktor 
Yushchenko promised to immediately put the country on the European “rails” and carry out a deep 
modernization of a deeply corrupt and backward state with a weak economy. It quickly became 
clear that Yushchenko did not quite succeed in fulfilling his plans. Rapid Europeanization did not 
work out, the winners failed miserably in the role of modern state managers, disappointing not only 
the population of Ukraine, but also their patrons in Europe and the United States, who actively 
promoted them during the “Orange Revolution”. In 2010, as a result of the presidential election, 
Viktor Yanukovych, who was once overthrown during the “Color Revolution”, comes to power, but 
he also fails to make significant progress in modernizing the economy and politics of Ukraine. 
The current events in Ukraine show that the contradictions that led to the crisis in the first half 
of 2000 have not been resolved in the past period, they reappeared at the next round of political and 
economic development. In modern Ukraine, there is a rather deep economic and political crisis. 
This led to the next “Maidan”. From my point of view, it is of particular relevance to identify the 
true causes of the current destructive processes in the Ukrainian state and to predict the 
consequences of these events on the development of the situation both within Ukraine and in the 
post-Soviet space. 
Begun as a protest of a disillusioned population, protests on Independence Square turned into 
the largest street performances since the "Orange Revolution". The protesters perceive their action 
as the most important expression of national identity and a symbol of a single “Euro-breakthrough” 
of all Ukraine. 
Not only Kyiv residents took to the streets of Kiev, but also representatives of many cities of 
Ukraine. On the buildings one could see ads from residents with a proposal to shelter non-resident 
fighters for European integration. The protesters did not just sit on the “Maidan” and demanded the 
resignation of Viktor Yanukovych - they blocked the presidential administration and seized the city 
administration of Kiev. A flag of the European Union fluttered above the building. 
The breakdown of the signing of the association agreement between Ukraine and the EU, 
from my point of view, only served as a pretext for mass unrest, the reasons are much deeper. The 
views of domestic and Western experts on the sources, causes and ways of resolving the current 
Ukrainian crisis are polar divergent, and it is fair to say that in these assessments for the first time 
after the end of the “Cold War”, aggression towards each other is traced. For the West, Russia is the 
third party in the civil war in Ukraine, and the Russian leadership categorically rejects such a 
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position of the US and the EU. Another topic, tracing both domestic and foreign publications, 
concerns external interference in the affairs of Ukraine. The West blames Russia for this, and 
Russia rightly speaks of the interference of the US and the EU in the affairs of a sovereign 
Ukrainian state. Of course, exogenous factors had a strong influence on the devastating Ukrainian 
crisis, but it is also necessary to take into account the influence of factors of an endogenous order, 
without which it would be almost impossible for outside forces to shake the situation in the country. 
One of the main reasons for the Ukrainian crisis, which is given insufficient, in my opinion, 
attention, is the deep economic crisis in the country. The modernization of the economy promised 
by the authorities failed. The Ukrainian economy is undergoing a massive crisis. The growth of 
wages and incomes of the population has stopped. To stimulate demand, both consumer and 
investment, the government has no money. 
The next most important reason that led to a systemic crisis, and later to a civil war, is a rather 
serious political polarization of the Ukrainian population. According to a survey conducted in 
Ukraine, almost half of the residents support the country's accession to the European Union. Such a 
strong stratification largely determined the current socio-political situation in the country and made 
it impossible to resolve the issue by means of the political technologies of the “color revolutions”, 
ultimately resulting in a civil war, as was the case in the countries where the “Arab Spring” took 
place. 
Among the internal causes of the coup in Ukraine, it is also worth highlighting the ideology of 
Nazism. The neo-Nazi organizations became the driving force behind the coup. 
I would like to note the following important factor of a purely internal order, which 
undoubtedly influenced the escalation of chaos in the Ukrainian state. These are oligarchs who used 
chaos in their favor and fought, including among themselves, for the redistribution of spheres of 
influence. Oligarch Petro Poroshenko became president of Ukraine. The largest business groups of 
Ukraine are key players not only in the economy, but also in politics, including foreign ones. 
Thus, I believe that the aggravation of the situation in Ukraine was influenced not only by 
internal, but also by external forces. The “Maidan” was visited by many foreign high-ranking 
officials - US Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, Senator John McCain, US Ambassador 
Jeffrey Payet, the head of Lithuania, EU Presidency Dalia Grybauskaite, Swedish Foreign Minister 
Carl Bildt and others. All of them called on the Ukrainian population to fight for their rights and in 
fact provoked a coup in the country. However, it is worth noting that the visits of Western guests to 
“Maidan” are only a small part of the methods and technologies that were used by the USA and the 
EU for the revolution in Ukraine and the realization of their geopolitical ambitions. The main 
striking force was the technology of “Color Revolutions”, “soft power”, “controlled chaos”. Only 
this, according to representatives of the United States and Europe, is capable of leveling the defeat 
of the European Union in Vilnius and wresting the country from the Russian sphere of influence. 
An important feature of the Ukrainian crisis is the aggressive behavior of the West, which 
used all the methods of the “Cold War” to influence the Ukrainian situation. Among them, the 
method of militant propaganda, one of the effective instruments of orientation and control of the 
masses during the confrontation of sociopolitical systems, as well as the wide application of the 
policy of double standards, is very important. 
How to build further relations with the EU, on the one hand, and with the Customs Union, on 
the other, of course, Ukraine itself to decide. 
First of all, confrontation in the modern world is fraught with very serious consequences for 
all members of the world community. Further isolation of the EU and the Customs Union from each 
other will entail a number of negative points. The main ones include economic losses; greater 
escalation of confrontational tendencies in relations between the EU and Russia; intensification of 
contradictions in the post-Soviet space (Ukraine is a vivid example here); weakening of 
interdependence and mutual influence on the continent. In the end, this will adversely affect 
stability and security issues. 
It must be said, both in Russian and in Ukrainian society, today aversion to each other is 
cultivated. In Russia, the tendency of non-acceptance of the West, the mood of pseudo-
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consolidation against the enemy, became noticeable in society. This is a very dangerous trend, 
because in the US and the EU a negative image of Russia, an image of an enemy, is also being 
created. One of the goals of the US political vector has already been achieved. 
 
 
6.2 Events in the East of Ukraine 
 
All subsequent events on the “Maidan” were only a pretext for the emergence of a 
confrontation in the South-East of Ukraine. The real reason for this bloody confrontation is the 
conflict, constantly fanned by the political elite, between the views of a significant number of the 
population of the West and South-East of Ukraine on the present and future of the Ukrainian state 
and its foreign policy. Since the declaration of independence, the West of Ukraine has assumed the 
right to speak on behalf of the whole of Ukraine and in February 2014, it seemed to have won. As a 
result of the coup, the pro-Western Government came to power. But the Southeast did not believe 
his program. He considered this as another castling of oligarchic and political clans. On this wave 
the Crimea Peninsula left Ukraine, a civil war in the South-East has begun. The conflict went 
beyond the framework of political discussions in legal political bodies and turned into an armed 
confrontation of forces that differently understand the state structure of Ukraine, its allies and 
friends in the future. “Maidan” has awakened not only civil society in the West of Ukraine, but also 
in the South-East. 
In geopolitical terms, the civil war in Ukraine can and should be viewed as a confrontation 
between the United States and Russia. One thing is clear that the unipolar world has come to an end 
and forcing Russia to act against their own interests, no one will succeed. Of course, this cannot but 
affect the social programs of the Russian government, but all global players, and especially its 
neighbors, should take into account its new international practice. And of course, the political forces 
of Ukraine especially need to weigh their foreign policy actions, because Ukraine and Russia are 
neighbors. 
 
 
7. Results 
The results from the analysis are drawing the main prospects for the development of the 
People's Republics of Donbass as independent subjects of international politics. 
The most acute reaction of the population to the events of “Euromaidan” was observed in the 
Republic of Crimea. The events that took place in Kiev prompted the peninsula authorities to hold a 
referendum on joining the Russian Federation. On the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, 
protests against the new Ukrainian leadership were also held, the population refused to recognize its 
legitimacy. As part of a speech against the replacement of the acting governors, a process was 
launched to form a parallel system of government bodies, the result of which was the creation of the 
Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics. Since then, both people's republics have developed as 
independent political subjects, as evidenced by the creation of their own, state institutions that are 
not controlled by Kiev. 
In April 2014, hostilities began in the South-East of Ukraine. On the one hand, the armed 
forces of Ukraine together, and on the other hand the formation of the republics. In order to end the 
bloodshed, on September 5, 2014, the «Minsk Protocol» was signed in Minsk, aimed at the peaceful 
settlement of the conflict. On February 12, 2015, it was supplemented with new agreements 
developed during negotiations between President of Russia, President of France, head of the 
German government and Ukrainian president. In accordance with the «Minsk agreements», was 
proposed to secure a special status for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. [22] Thus, the agreements 
did not envisage the transformation of the republics into subjects of international relations, but 
viewed them as subjects of the internal Ukrainian negotiation process. This document received the 
support of the UN Security Council and became the basis for all further peace talks on Donbass. 
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    It was planned to complete the settlement of the conflict by the end of 2015. However, 
since the signing until now, none of the 13 points of the agreements has been fully implemented. It 
seems that the refusal of the leadership of Ukraine to start a dialogue with the proclaimed republics 
of Donbass, can lead to a prolonged freezing of the conflict. Under these conditions, it is becoming 
more and more likely that the Donetsk and Luhansk republics will try to act as independent subjects 
of international politics. 
    I will try to consider possible scenarios of developments in this direction.  
1) One of the possible ways for the development of the Donbass republics as subjects of 
international politics is the scenario of transformation into de facto independent, but partially 
recognized states. The most important condition for its implementation is that the troops of the 
people's republics maintain control over their territories for at least the next five years. In this case, 
there will be a chance that in the next 10-15 years the independence of the people's republics of 
Donbass will be recognized by any UN member states, as well as by various partially recognized 
states. At the moment, the independence of Donbass was recognized only by one partially 
recognized state - South Ossetia. [23] Currently, the international positions of the authorities in 
Donetsk and Luhansk can be destabilized by the political situation in Ukraine, which can be 
affected by such factors as the further development of a full-scale economic crisis, as well as an 
increase in protest moods in other regions, in particular, in the west of the country that the turn can, 
on the other hand, plunge Ukraine into the abyss of political chaos, which will result in a complete 
loss by Kiev of control over the territory of Donbass. 
2) The implementation of the “Crimean” scenario [24] in Donetsk and Luhansk can 
occur in the event of a further destabilization of the political situation in Ukraine. Currently, the 
likelihood of the implementation of the “Crimean” scenario in the Donbass is extremely low. There 
are several reasons for this. First of all, it is necessary to identify the main differences between the 
two political situations. The most important factor is the absence of Russian military units on the 
territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In the case of Crimea, the presence of the Black Sea Fleet 
of the Russian Federation on the peninsula played a decisive role. In the absence of the Black Sea 
Fleet on the territory of the Crimea, the process of joining Russia could not be successfully 
completed, and a political conflict could even go into the stage of military confrontation. [11] 
Another difference of political situations is that the realization of the scenario favorable for the 
population of Crimea became possible due to the influence of the Russian factor, which 
traditionally plays an important role in the ethnic structure of the population of the Crimean 
Peninsula. In accordance with the indicators of the census conducted in 2014, the number of the 
Russian ethnic group on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula is 67.9%. [25] In the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions, according to the latest Ukrainian population census, 38.2 and 39% [26], 
respectively. It was the Russian ethnic majority that became the decisive factor, whose active 
position allowed us to make the promptest decisions required for secession from Ukraine and 
joining the Russian Federation. Similar key political decisions were also taken due to the presence 
of their autonomous governing bodies in the Crimea - the Supreme Council and the Council of 
Ministers, which allowed, unlike Donbass, to legitimately hold a referendum. In the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions, the situation looked somewhat different, since such autonomous governing bodies 
were not there. In addition, despite the configuration of political forces at the level of regional 
legislative power that was similar to the Crimea, the necessary decisions in the Donbass did not take 
place promptly. As noted, the main reason was that, in contrast to the Crimea, the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions were not ready at the institutional level to quickly make the necessary political 
decisions for themselves.  
Also, the regional authorities of these areas did not show the required political will, as a result 
of which it took some time to “reformat” the political elite. The processes of “reformatting” the 
regional political elite in Donetsk and Luhansk actually ended on April 2014 (the Donetsk People’s 
Republic was proclaimed on April 7; the Luhansk People’s Republic was proclaimed on April 27). 
It should be noted that despite the high popularity among the population of Donetsk and Luhansk of 
the idea of joining Russia, there has recently been a certain tendency to decrease the confidence of 
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the people of the people's republics in the policies pursued by the Russian Federation in their 
attitude: in December 2017 the level of distrust of the residents of Donetsk Republic to the policy of 
the Russian Federation amounted to 41.3%, while in December 2018-14.3% [27]. 
3) “Bosnian” scenario. [28] The main essence is to overcome the conflict in the south-
east of Ukraine along the path along which the political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
resolved. This can be implemented in the event that there is a re-escalation of the armed conflict in 
the Donbass and the adoption of a new agreement on its settlement is required. The author of the 
idea of implementing the “Bosnian” scenario in Ukraine is the British diplomat Crawford, he 
outlined the idea of preserving a formally united Ukraine with the creation on its territory of a 
virtually independent state entity within the borders of Donetsk and Luhansk republics. [29] 
According to Crawford, the meaning of the agreement, which may be beneficial to Russia, is to 
implement this scenario. If we talk about the mechanisms for implementing the “Bosnian” scenario 
in practice, then at the initial stage of its implementation, the adoption of a peace agreement in 
Ukraine (analogous to the «Dayton agreements» signed in 1995) is required. The states guarantors 
in the course of the negotiation process could be Russia, Germany and France. An integral 
condition for its implementation is the reform of the federalization of Ukraine. To do this, the 
agreement should fix a rule on changing the administrative and territorial structure of the country 
(transition from the unitary to the federal system) by creating on its territory three autonomous 
entities: The Federal Republic of Ukraine, Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s 
Republic. All regions that are currently part of Ukraine should be included in the Federal Republic 
of Ukraine, with the exception of part of the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Also in the 
country should conduct a new reform aimed at expanding autonomy at the regional and municipal 
levels. 
So, it’s noted that in the event of non-compliance with the «Minsk Agreements» and the 
freezing of the conflict in the South-East of Ukraine, it may be possible to implement several 
development scenarios of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics as independent subjects of 
international politics. But in the near future, the probability of practical implementation of any of 
the considered scenarios is quite small. If we talk about a long-term forecast (10-15 years), the first 
scenario is most likely, since the “Crimean” scenario can be realized only in the event of a dramatic 
aggravation of the political crisis in Ukraine, and also subject to a change in Russia's position 
regarding the recognition of the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk republics that is currently 
impracticable. The “Bosnian” scenario is more likely than the “Crimean” scenario, since its 
implementation is possible only if a full-scale armed conflict resumes in the south-east of Ukraine 
and it becomes necessary to prepare a new agreement to resolve the conflict. 
      
8. Conclusion 
From 1992 to 2019, relations between the United States and Ukraine went through five 
presidents Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama and Trump, and from the Ukrainian side - 
Kravchuk, Kuchma, Yushchenko, Yanukovych, Poroshenko. The five presidents, their various 
foreign policy trends and political values had an important influence on the development of 
relations between the United States and Ukraine. In relations of both parties there is both strategic 
cooperation and serious contradictions. Unlike the United States and other countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, such as Kazakhstan, the relationship between the United 
States and Ukraine is not sustainable and gradual development, but ups and downs aimed at the 
pragmatic pursuit of one’s own goals. This reflects an important feature of relations between the 
United States and Ukraine. This is the asymmetry of bilateral relations. Ukraine regards the United 
States as the main partner helping to conduct European integration and join the existing European 
system. 
The value of Ukraine in the US external strategy differs significantly. With the exception of 
Russia, the US strategy towards the CIS countries is within the same framework: countries have the 
same priority in the US strategy, and there are no qualitative differences. Nevertheless, the United 
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States, being the only country in the world that can have a comprehensive direct and indirect impact 
on Ukraine (through international organizations, European Union, other Western countries and even 
Russia), is at the center of external strategic priorities. Many of the national strategic goals of 
Ukraine are possible only if they are actively supported by the United States. Both sides are not on 
the same level in their diplomatic experience. As a “new” independent country, Ukraine is often too 
naive and full of idealism. The United States constantly develops a new understanding and position 
in relations with other countries in accordance with the needs of global and regional strategies. The 
US policy towards Ukraine reflects obvious uncertainties and gaps, which creates artificial 
obstacles to the development of bilateral relations. It is also an important internal cause of the crisis 
in relations between the United States and Ukraine. The United States has never been able to get rid 
of the habit of observing Ukraine through the prism of Russian policy, so the real “turn” in relations 
with Ukraine will occur only when relations between Russia and the United States seriously 
deteriorate. As soon as relations between Russia and the United States improve, this will affect 
relations between the United States and Ukraine. 
Western sanctions and pressure from the international community forced Russia to be at a 
disadvantage in the Ukrainian crisis. But this is a test of strategic will, and not just a struggle of 
strategic interests. Russia made it clear that Ukraine is the main interest that it protects at all costs. 
Although the United States supports Ukraine in all directions, the latter is only its Eurasian strategy, 
or rather, a “pawn” in the vector of the strategy for Russia. American strategists and scientists with 
realistic positions believe that the US should not oppose Russia on the Ukrainian issue. What the 
US is worried about is the loss of strategic will, not the gain or loss of strategic gains and losses. 
After the crisis, the United States supported Ukraine politically. This is also confirmed by the policy 
of stagnating economic and military aid. In the future, there is a chance that the United States and 
Russia will definitely resolve the crisis and come out of confrontation. The crisis confrontation 
between the two countries also shows that the initiative and permanent party, as a rule, does not 
have a significant impact on resolving the crisis. The final outcome of a crisis often depends on how 
much the parties are willing to make concessions. In other words, obtaining the benefits associated 
with the crisis are the main factors determining the crisis. While one side is firmly convinced that it 
protects its core interests, regardless of the pressure exerted by the other side, it is impossible to 
make substantial concessions. It was tested and tested during the Berlin crisis, Cuban crisis and 
Russian-Georgian conflict. The United States could not correctly understand the interests of Russia 
in the post-Soviet space. After the onset of the Ukrainian crisis, the US reacted improperly, 
especially on March 18, when the Ukrainian response to the Crimean question was not strong 
enough. At that moment, the United States had no levers of influence on Russia. After the 
beginning of the civil war, the Ukrainians were trapped. Minor changes occurred in the US position. 
In contrast to the previous positive intervention and a tough position, a certain degree of 
“detachment” appeared. Shortly after the meeting of the President of Russia and Ukraine in Minsk 
on August 29, 2014, Obama made it clear that the United States does not intend to take military 
action to resolve the Ukrainian problem. During Poroshenko’s visit to the United States on 
September 18, the United States did not agree to form an alliance with Ukraine, but agreements 
were reached to provide funding in the amount of $ 5 million. The day before, US Assistant 
Secretary of State Fried visited Kiev, he also suggested that sanctions against Russia could be lifted 
or weakened should the Crimea return to Ukraine. In its speech at the UN General Assembly, the 
expansion of Russia was named one of the three main threats facing the United States along with 
the “Islamic State” and the “Ebola” virus. This suggests that the Ukrainian crisis has lost its position 
in the US diplomatic agenda and strategic considerations. At least this is no longer the main goal. 
In the era of globalization, intervention is no longer a moral issue. This is an economic 
problem that is considered in terms of economic benefits. Successful intervention should, above all, 
be a responsible intervention. The US intervention in many conflicts in Eurasia has led to confusion 
and chaos. This is obviously irresponsible and unsuccessful. This is a mistake in terms of the 
effectiveness of the intervention. The antiterrorist practice of the United States after the September 
11 incident also proves that without substantial support from Russia, the United States will not be 
12 
 
able to effectively solve the problem of the “Islamic state”, which could be an opportunity for the 
United States to correct its previous policy in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. 
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